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1. Introduction
In the unitary model, household behavior is considered as resulting from the decisions of a
single unit, concealing the fact that most households consist of several members. Since
flexible and easily identifiable, this representation of household decision processes is very
popular when estimating household preferences, particularly in the presence of a complex
budget constraint (see for instance van Soest, 1995). In this respect, it is a convenient
model when studying the impact of a real or topical tax reform on household behavior (see
e.g., Blundell, Duncan, McCrae, & Meghir, 2000). Yet, the unitary model treats the family
as a black box and consequently the within family income redistribution resulting from a
policy reform cannot be identified. Alternatively, the collective approach specifies the
individual preferences of family members and simply assumes that the household decision
making process leads to Pareto efficient allocations.
The present paper proposes a quantification of the distortions in tax reform analysis
entailed by the use of a unitary model when the data are collective. The evaluation of tax
reforms based on both unitary and collective models has been suggested by Beninger and
Laisney (2002). Using purely synthetic data, they find important discrepancies in the
incentive and distribution effects of revenue neutral reforms based on unitary estimates
rather than on the collective parameters. The aim of the present paper is to check the
robustness of these results when the collective baseline situation is generated using real
world data. This is done by means of a collective model calibrated on real data as described
in Frederic Vermeulen et al. (2006), and by estimating a unitary model on this ‘collective
data set’. We focus on German data, and a revenue neutral tax reform that consists of
replacing the smooth progressive tax schedule and the current means tested social benefits
by a simple two parameter linear taxation system involving a basic income and a flat tax.
The same exercise is replicated for other European countries and other topical reforms.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The second section briefly introduces the baseline
German tax and benefit system (corresponding to the year 1998). Section 3 gives statistical
evidence on the data used, the 1998 wave of the GSOEP. Estimation results for the unitary
model are given in Section 4. Section 5 compares normative and positive analyses of the
tax reform on the basis of the two models. Section 6 concludes.
2. The 1998 German tax-benefit system
The German tax system is characterized by comprehensive taxation of various income
sources through a smooth nonlinear tax schedule, and by joint taxation of couples. After
deduction of income related expenses, child allowances and maintenance payments to ex
partners, the individual marginal tax rate starts off at 25.9% (applicable from an annual
personal allowance of 6,322 euro). The top rate is 53% for yearly earnings in excess of
61,376 euro. The tax schedule is the same for singles and for couples, but for couples, the
‘splitting’ system is applied: the tax liability per person is assessed on the basis of half of
the joint taxable income, and the outcome is doubled to obtain the total income tax liability
of the spouses. Employees are also subject to social security contributions on earnings at a
more or less constant rate of about 20%. As these contributions are related to claims toward
the social security system, they are treated here as consumption expenses that do not
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reduce disposable income, and are thus excluded from our narrow definition of the tax
benefit system.1
We consider means tested social benefits of a maximum of 511 euro per individual per
month plus age depent supplementary payments for children.2 In addition, there is a
universal child benefit, but parents may opt instead for an alternative tax deduction. Dis
posable income is defined in the study as net income minus net maintenance payments to or
from parents, children and ex partners.
The German tax benefit system results in nonconvex budget sets for a large proportion
of households (this concerns more than half of the couples in the sample used). A detailed
description of the tax benefit system and an illustration of the potential nonconvexity of the
budget constraint are provided in Appendix A.
3. Data
Our exercise consists in estimating a unitary model on the basis of realistically simulated
collective data. For this purpose, we use data from the 1998 wave of the German Socio
Economic Panel (GSOEP) and then simulate individual behavior according to collective
rationality. This section briefly describes the basic data selection, and recalls the two step
construction of the collective data base. More detailed information on the sample chosen
and some descriptive statistics are given in Appendix B.
The GSOEP is a representative panel data sample of households and individuals living
in Germany. It started in 1984 with annual interviews in the Federal Republic of Germany
and was extended to the former German Democratic Republic from 1990 on. The panel
gives a wealth of information on the labour market status of individuals and on the various
income sources of families.
We selected German nationals aged between 25 and 55 years. All are employees with a
contractual labour supply of at least 10 h per week or individuals who are voluntarily out
of employment. The restriction on hours is introduced to avoid extraordinary high wage
rates as the ratio of earnings over hours due to measurement error for people with less than
10 h. As usual in labour supply studies, we exclude the self employed, students, indi
viduals on parental leave, and the (registered) unemployed.
The sample of singles consists of 488 individuals: 208 women and 280 men. Here a
‘single’ is a one person household. He or she may have dependent children living outside
the household. We also selected 1,332 families living in a one or two generation
households composed of a married couple and dependent (possibly working) children. The
children may live inside or outside the household.
Married women have a significantly lower participation rate than married men or sin
gles. The distribution of labour supply is more evenly spread for wives than for husbands:
they work more often in part time jobs. In particular the wives’ weekly working time
distribution has a mode at 20 h.
To obtain a data set representing the collective world for Germany, we use the following
two step procedure (details are given in Vermeulen et al., 2006). In the first step, we
estimate preference parameters for single men and women and then predict their labour
1 Admittedly, the different types of social security contributions paid in Germany have different con
sumptive aspects, and our assumption is probably more appropriate for payments to the pension system than
for health insurance contributions.
2 Social benefits are 10% lower in the East: this difference is justified by the lower costs of living in the East.
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supply and the corresponding consumption level under the 1998 German tax benefit sys
tem. This also involves the estimation of wage equations. In the second step, for families
composed of a married couple (and children), we determine the partners’ relative weights
in the household (‘‘male power index’’). We suppose that the preferences of married
individuals differ from those of singles by an additional cross leisure term, different for
females and males (df and dm hereafter). Therefore, apart from the latter, we assume that
married individuals basically retain the same preferences as before marriage.
The predicted labour supplies, that almost perfectly fit the observed hours of work, are
taken as the baseline situation for the estimation of the unitary model (see Beninger,
Laisney, & Beblo, 2003, for details on the German collective data).
4. Unitary model: estimation
We now describe the estimation procedure for the unitary model, and the estimation
results.
4.1. Estimation procedure for the unitary model
For the specification of the unitary model, we adopt the analogue to the individual utility
functions used in the collective model (see Vermeulen et al., 2006). In order to remain
close to the situation faced by an investigator who only observes aggregate household
consumption, we do not take advantage of the fact that the collective baseline situation
contains each spouse’s consumption (see Myck et al., 2006). Thus, we specify:
U c; lf ; lm; d
 
bcðdÞ ln c cðdÞ½ 
þ bfl ðdÞ ln lf lfðdÞ
 þ bml ðdÞ ln lm lmðdÞ½ 
þ dðdÞ ln lf lfðdÞ  ln lm lmðdÞ½ : ð1Þ
Appendix C gives the conditions under which this utility function is increasing in its
arguments and concave. We also experimented with direct translog utility functions along
the lines of van Soest (1995), but with a quadratic form in logs of departures from minimal
requirements, as in Eq. (1). Although several specifications were superior to our preferred
specification in terms of likelihood values, all led to utility functions that were nonin
creasing in at least one argument for a majority of observations. This made them useless
for tax reform analysis.
The b and d functions are assumed to be linear in d , and the minimum requirements in
consumption and leisure are set to the values chosen for the collective model. Of course,
the budget constraint remains the same as for the collective model.
We suppose that each spouse has K alternative values hk for his/her weekly labour
supply, leading to leisure choices lk=T)hk, where T is the total time available: 168 h a
week. We choose K=7, and the following set of possible values for hk: 0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50,
60. Hence, the couple has K2=49 possible combinations. If U^ j U^ cj; l
f
j ; l
m
j ; d
 
denotes
the utility generated by combination j of the set of combinations { (cj,l j
f,lj
m)j 1
K^2}, adding an
error term ej to the utility derived from combination j, we have:
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U^ j U^ cj; l
f
j ; l
m
j ; d
 
þ ej 8j 1; . . . ;K2: ð2Þ
The distribution of ej is assumed to be the extreme value distribution defined by:
Pr ej\e
 
exp exp eð Þð Þ; e 2 R; ð3Þ
and the e are assumed independent. If combination j is chosen by a household, its con
tribution to the likelihood is
Pr U^ j[U^ k ; 8k 6 j
  exp U^ cj; l
f
j ; l
m
j ; d
 h i
PK2
k 1 exp U^ ck ; l
f
k ; l
m
k ; d
 h i : ð4Þ
This corresponds to the likelihood of the multinomial logit model. In order to account
for unobservable heterogeneity in consumption, we also estimate a discrete mixture of such
models (see Heckman & Singer, 1984; Hoynes, 1996) with two to three mass points on the
coefficient of ln c c dð Þ½  (mixed multinomial logit model, MMNL; details are given in
Vermeulen et al., 2006, Appendix A.2).
4.2. Estimation results
Table 1 presents estimation results for a model with three mass points. Although the
coefficient of the third mass point is poorly determined (b3
c), and the estimated regime
probabilities are extremely unequal (.990, .008, and .002, computed from the logits e1 and
e2, see Eq. (20) in Vermeulen et al., 2006), an LR test rejects the specification with two
mass points, which itself rejects the MNL specification. We conducted a descending
specification search, starting with a full set of household and personal characteristics for d
in bc and d and with only own characteristics plus characteristics of children in bf and bm.
For instance, an indicator to distinguish between households in East and West Germany,
included to account for potential heterogeneity of the two populations, turns out to have a
significant effect only on the d coefficient. Among the variables d we also include
information concerning the regimes (i.e. mass points) ‘chosen’ in the calibration of the
collective model (see Vermeulen et al., 2006, line below Eq. (20)). The inclusion of this
kind of ‘observed unobservable heterogeneity’ aims at maximum fairness towards the
unitary model. The corresponding variables turn out to be highly significant in several
places (variables reg3f and reg1m).
Given these parameter estimates, all couples present a positive marginal utility of the
female’s leisure. The concavity condition is satisfied for all couples (at least for the
‘chosen’ regime, see the next section). The presence of children has a negative effect on
the consumption coefficient. This effect increases if the household has children less than
6 years old. Living in Eastern Germany has a negative effect on the unitary estimate of the
interaction term d. Table 2 gives statistics on the cross leisure terms for both models and
depending on the number of children. In the unitary estimates, d is positive on average, and
is negative for 3 couples only. In the collective model the calibrated dm (for males) is also
positive on average, but much smaller, and the calibrated df (for females) is negative on
average for all household types, a puzzling result that warrants further research. At this
stage our conjecture is that this may be connected to our insufficient treatment of time
devoted to household production activities.
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5. Predictions with the unitary model
We assume that the regime corresponding to a couple is the one which gives the best labour
supply predictions under the condition that it leads to an increasing utility function. The
frequencies of the regimes are more or less in accordance with the estimated probabilities,
although regime 2 is chosen more often than it should (.053 predicted versus .008
Table 1 MMNL estimates of preferences for couples: 3 mass points
Coef. s.e. t Value
bK
f ln lf lf
  kid 5.27 1.15 4.6
bK6
f ln lf lf
  kid6 1.01 .30 3.4
bsr
f ln lf lf
  sch realf .55 .25 2.2
bju
f ln lf lf
  job unif .92 .40 2.4
bf
rf
3
ln lf lf
  reg3f 5.02 .52 9.6
b0
f ln lf lf
 
.80 .70 1.1
b K
m ln lm lm
  kid 3.15 1.21 2.6
bju
m ln lm lm
  kid6 1.12 .31 3.7
b0
m ln lm lm
 
1.40 .76 1.9
da_f
2 ln lf lf
  ln lm lm  ln agef
 2
.12 .01 9.5
dK ln lf lf
  ln lm lm  kid 1.38 .31 4.5
dK6 ln lf lf
  ln lm lm  kid6 .34 .11 3.0
dsrf ln l
f lf
  ln lm lm  sch realf .56 .11 5.0
dsaf ln l
f lf
  ln lm lm  sch abif .49 .14 3.5
dsam ln l
f lf
  ln lm lm  sch abim .15 .06 2.6
djnm ln l
f lf
  ln lm lm  job noapm .18 .07 2.6
dE ln lf lf
  ln lm lm  East .56 .04 12.4
drf
3
ln lf lf
  ln lm lm  reg3f 1.49 .13 11.7
bK
c ln c cð Þ  kid 10.82 1.92 5.6
bK6
c ln c cð Þ  kid6 3.77 1.19 3.2
bcsrf ln c cð Þ  sch realf 5.56 1.20 4.6
bcsaf ln c cð Þ  sch abif 5.28 1.46 3.6
bc
rf
3
ln c cð Þ  reg3f 16.94 1.25 13.5
bcrm
1
ln c cð Þ  reg1m 4.21 .97 4.3
b1
c ln c cð Þ, regime 1 26.94 1.92 14.0
b2
c ln c cð Þ, regime 2 10.81 3.01 3.6
b3
c ln c cð Þ, regime 3 22.39 44.67 0.5
e1 ‘‘logit’’, regime 1 6.36 .85 7.5
e2 ‘‘logit’’, regime 2 1.58 1.05 1.5
log likelihood mp 3 4218.75
log likelihood mp 2 4224.75
log lik. multinomial logit 4245.56
Notes: kid and kid6 are dummies with value 1 if the couple has at least one child and one child less than
6 years old. sch realf, sch realm, sch abif and sch abim are dummies with value 1 if the wife (f) or the
husband (m) have short and long secondary schooling. job unif and job noapm are dummies with value 1 if
the wife has university or college degree and if the husband has no training, respectively. East is a dummy
with value 1 if the couple lives in East Germany. reg3f and reg1m are dummies with value 1 if the third
consumption regime was the best one for the wife and the first consumption regime was the best one for the
husband in the calibration procedure, respectively. (ln agef)
2 is the square of the wife’s log age in years. mp
is the number of mass points. e1 and e2 allow the computation of the regime probabilities (see Eq. (20) in
Vermeulen et al., 2006)
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estimated probability). The third regime is never chosen, as it never satisfies the positivity
restrictions on the marginal utility of consumption.
As reported in Tables 3 and 4, the unitary model performs moderately well in predicting
labour supply. Predictions are correct for only a third of the wives and for 45% of the
husbands. The margins of the tables are not very well predicted, except for the participation
rate. The results for cells within the tables are bad, as some large discrepancies occur. For
instance, more than 44% of nonparticipating wives are predicted to work.3 The unitary
model tends to smooth the hours distribution. The mode is significantly lower for the
Table 2 d(d) coefficients in unitary and collective model by number of children
no ch. 1 ch. 2 ch. ‡3 ch. Total
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean s.d. Min. Max.
d 4.12 1.47 1.23 1.07 1.93 1.43 .23 6.42
df 4.17 3.34 3.63 3.43 3.63 3.22 12 6
dm .21 .02 .21 .62 .19 2.23 8 6
no. 296 410 478 148 1,332
Note: d corresponds to the cross leisure term estimate for the unitary model. df and dm are calibrated values
from the collective model, for female and male, respectively
Table 3 Collective versus unitary female labour supply, baseline tax scheme
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Total
0 15.99 6.98 3.30 2.10 .30 28.68
10 4.13 .90 1.28 .90 7.21
20 6.76 3.75 3.45 2.48 .75 17.19
30 2.63 1.88 2.78 2.93 2.70 .23 13.14
40 3.30 2.63 3.90 9.23 11.49 2.70 33.26
50 .23 .08 .08 .00 .38
60 .08 .08 .00 .15
Total 33.11 16.14 14.71 17.79 15.32 2.93 .00 1,332
Note: rows: wives’ collective labour supply, columns: unitary. Entries in the body of the table and in the
margins give frequencies (in %), except the last cell which gives the number of observations. Bold entries in
the body of the table: diagonal (their sum gives the percentage of correct predictions). Bold entries in the
margins: modes
Table 4 Collective versus unitary male labour supply, baseline tax scheme
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Total
0 .45 .60 .30 .23 1.35 .23 3.15
10 .08 .08 .23 .08 .45
20 .00 .15 .30 .45
30 .30 .83 .45 1.20 4.58 2.70 .08 10.14
40 1.35 8.93 3.30 8.71 40.47 16.14 .60 79.50
50 .23 .08 .15 1.73 3.68 .30 6.16
60 .15 .00 .15
Total 2.10 10.66 4.13 10.51 48.65 22.97 .98 1,332
Note: see note to Table 3
3 This conditional frequency is obtained from the first row of Table 3: 1 (15.99/28.68) .443.
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unitary model, both for women and men: 80% of the husbands actually work full time in
the collective baseline situation, but only 49% are predicted to work 40 h with the unitary
model. Labor supply of both spouses is underpredicted on average. This points to the
misspecification of the unitary model. However, the predictions from this particular model
are in line with those found in the literature.
5.1. Linear tax reform
A linear tax schedule is applied with joint taxation for couples. It consists of a basic income
plus a flat tax rate, replacing the current means tested social benefits and the smooth
progressive tax rate. The tax reform applied linearizes the budget constraint, which is a
rather large departure from the present design of the German tax benefit system.
Approximate revenue neutrality is achieved by setting the negative income tax for zero
income at )6,000 euro for singles and )9,600 euro for couples and computing the constant
marginal tax rate for both singles and couples as residual tax rate. It is important to note
that the definition of a revenue neutral reform will differ if it is based on the unitary rather
than on the collective model, because predicted behavioral adjustments will differ between
the two models. In fact the unitary model leads to a flat tax rate of t=.403, the collective
model to t=.428. This lets the reform appear much more favorable for singles (relatively)
with the unitary than with the collective model.
In Fig. 1, we consider for the sake of illustration the changes in disposable income
following the reform, for a particular individual, in euro per week. This is a single woman
with the mean gross hourly wage rate of single women (about 13 euro), and no capital
income.4 This woman is thus a potential recipient of social benefits. The move to a linear
-
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Fig. 1 Change in disposable income, single woman, w 13 euro, no capital income
4 We discuss the situation for a single rather than for a couple, because for couples the budget constraint is
more difficult to represent graphically.
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tax system is beneficial for her only over a narrow range of hours corresponding to the
progressive withdrawal of social benefits in the 1998 system. A first decrease (in post
compared to pre reform disposable income) at very low hours is due to the fact that the flat
tax rate applies from the first hour of work. A second one is due to the fact that under the
1998 system that person faces lower marginal tax rates. Wealthy households will gain from
the reform.
5.2. Positive aspects of the reform
The unitary model introduces distortions in the prediction of tax revenues: Table 5 reveals
that the unitary setting overpredicts total tax revenue by .6 billion euro. Unlike the collective
model, the unitary model predicts couples to have higher tax liabilities under linear taxation.
We predict labour supply in the case of the baseline tax benefit system and the linear tax
reform (recall that the baseline situation used for each model consists of the predictions
from that model), and compare predicted participation rates and working hours for the
different tax systems, obtained with the collective and with the unitary models. The largest
discrepancies between collective and unitary predictions are obtained for wives. Under
linear taxation these discrepancies are partly due to differences in the reform definition
(regarding the tax rate), but for the 1998 tax system they are due only to the misspecifi
cation of the unitary model.
Table 6 compares the collective and unitary labour supply of wives after the reform for
wives.5 The quality of unitary predictions proves to be better for the reform than for the
baseline situation. However, labour supply is well predicted for only about a third of the
wives, and it is badly predicted (prediction error ‡20 h) for another third of them.
Tables 7 and 8 compare variations in unitary and collective labour supply for females
and males. The adjustment of labour supply following the tax reform is poorly predicted by
the unitary model, which predicts well the change in labour supply for only half of the
wives and half of the husbands well. Beninger et al. (2003) show that this is in general
verified for radical reforms, such as a linear tax reform. The reaction mostly a reduc
tion in hours worked is underestimated for wives but overpredicted for husbands. Indeed,
in the collective model wives’ labour supply is much more affected than husbands’ by
changes in the tax system. The unitary model predicts that more men than women change
their labour supply: nearly 72% of wives and 66% of husbands do not react to the reform
for the unitary model. This contradicts the results obtained with the collective model,
according to which the corresponding values are 61% and 73%.
Table 5 Tax revenues
Collective model Unitary model
Baseline Linear tax. Baseline Linear tax.
Single women 8.91 8.88 8.91 7.80
Single men 15.58 17.91 15.58 16.34
Couples 44.10 41.84 44.72 45.09
Total 68.59 68.63 69.21 69.23
Flat tax rate .428 .403
Note: total tax revenues in billion euro per year, using the sampling weights
5 The corresponding table for men is omitted to save on space.
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Interestingly, wives and husbands react more similarly to the reform in the unitary than
in the collective setting. Indeed, Table 9 shows that for almost 60% of couples (sum of the
diagonal elements), both spouses have the same labour supply change. The collective
model predicts the spouses to react differently to the tax reform (see Beninger et al., 2003).
5.3. Normative aspects of the reform
We describe the welfare effects of the reform measured at the household level by the
unitary model by showing the distribution of percentage changes in household utility for
Table 6 Collective versus unitary female labour supply, linear taxation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 Total
0 17.87 9.16 5.03 2.63 34.68
10 5.18 2.63 1.58 2.10 .60 12.09
20 3.83 3.30 4.88 3.00 2.10 .15 17.27
30 1.95 2.40 3.08 3.98 4.95 .45 16.82
40 1.05 .98 2.78 5.48 6.31 .75 17.34
50 .30 .45 .23 .45 .00 1.43
60 .15 .08 .15 .00 .38
Total 30.33 18.47 17.87 17.57 14.41 1.35 .00 1,332
Note: see note to Table 3
Table 7 Variation in female labour supply, collective versus unitary
£ 10 0 10 20 30 Total
£ 30 .53 1.28 .23 2.03
20 2.78 5.78 .45 .08 9.08
10 4.96 16.59 .60 .75 23.35
0 9.91 44.67 2.55 3.23 60.59
‡10 .83 3.00 .68 .38 4.96
Total 18.99 71.32 4.50 4.43 .00 1332
Note: rows: collective, columns: unitary. For example, for 5.78% of women the collective model predicts a
drop in labour supply by 20 h, while the unitary model predicts no change. Also see note to Table 3
Table 8 Variation in male labour supply, collective versus unitary
10 0 10 20 ‡30 Total
£ 30 .00
20 .00
10 5.33 18.32 .45 .83 1.95 26.88
0 12.76 47.45 2.03 4.65 5.86 72.75
‡10 .15 .00 .23 .38
Total 18.09 65.92 2.48 5.48 8.04 1332
Note: see note to Table 7
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every decile of the pre reform distribution of the household equivalent disposable income.6
These graphs require cautious interpretation. Considering percentage changes does not by
itself permit interpersonal or interhousehold welfare comparisons. But given that the
composition of deciles in corresponding graphs will remain identical across reforms, the
graphs may be expected to convey a feel for the importance of welfare effects. What is well
defined in the graphs is the information on proportions of winners and losers by decile. The
graphs show the quartiles of the distribution (box). The lines emerging from the box extend
upwards to the largest utility change smaller than Q75+1.5(Q75)Q25) and downwards to the
smallest utility change larger than Q25)1.5(Q75)Q25). Observations outside this range are
plotted individually.
Individual welfare effects of the reform are measured separately for husbands and wives
within the collective model framework. They are described by showing the distribution of
percentage changes in individual utility for every decile of the pre reform distribution of
the wives’ or husbands’ equivalent disposable income.7
A direct comparison of the welfare analysis based on the two models is made on the
basis of cross tabulation of the positions of households (winner, indifferent, loser) with the
pairs of positions of the spouses. A –.1% change has been taken to define indifference.
Considering the unitary model, very few couples benefit from the move to linear tax
ation (see Fig. 2). The reform also has a negative impact for most of the married women
(collective model, see Fig. 3). Only for men does this reform yield positive gains (see
Fig. 4). Table 10 compares the effects of a move to linear taxation. About 80% of the
couples are predicted to be welfare losers in the unitary framework. However, while over
80% of the wives are losers with the collective model, only 52% of the husbands are
predicted to be losers. The percentage of Pareto winning households (columns f+ m0, f0 m+
and f+ m+) is 7.8%, and there are over 60% Pareto losing households (columns f m , f m0
and f0m ). The percentage of households for which the move to linear taxation creates
potential conflict amounts to 29% (22.5% where wives gain and husbands lose, plus 6.7%
where wives lose and husbands gain). For 16% of the households, the unitary and the
collective predictions are contradictory (e.g., decrease in household utility for the unitary
model, while the reform is seen as Pareto improving at the household level for the col
lective model).
Table 9 Variation in unitary labour supply, female versus male
10 0 10 20 ‡30 Total
£ 10 4.06 14.87 .08 18.99
0 14.04 50.38 1.28 1.35 4.28 71.32
10 .68 .83 1.28 1.73 4.50
20 .30 2.33 1.80 4.43
30 .53 .23 .75
Total 18.09 65.92 2.48 5.48 8.04 1,332
Note: rows: female, columns: male. For example, in 14.04% of households the wife does not change her
labour supply after the reform, while her husband reduces his by 10 h. Bold entries in the body of the table:
households where both spouses adapt their hours of work in the same way
6 The equivalence scale for the household disposable income is a modified OECD scale: 1 for the first
parent, 0.7 for the second, 0.6 for each child over 16 years old, 0.5 for each child between 7 and 15 years
and 0.4 for each child younger than 6 years.
7 The equivalence scale for the individual disposable income is: 1 for the parent (the wife or the husband),
the same as above for the children.
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6. Summary of comparable results for other European countries or other reforms
Similar work was conducted for Belgium, France, Italy, and the UK.8 For Germany we also
summarize results obtained for other reforms than the move to linear taxation described
above (Beninger et al., 2003). All the reform definitions can be found in Section 6 in Myck
et al. (2006).
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Fig. 2 Relative welfare gains from a switch to linear taxation for households, unitary model
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Fig. 3 Relative welfare gains from a switch to linear taxation for married women, collective model
8 See the references given in Vermeulen et al. (2006).
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6.1. Belgium
Two baseline situations are considered. The first situation corresponds to predictions ob
tained from the collective model with the estimated power index and estimated coefficients
of leisure interaction. The second situation starts from the calibrated values of these
variables (to allow shifts in bargaining power following a reform, the constant in the power
index regression is adjusted so that the estimated index corresponds to the calibrated one).
Unitary models, including a leisure interaction term, are estimated on both of these data
sets. Regular preferences are obtained for only 38% and 24% of the observations,
respectively, and adjustments to the marginal propensity to consume are performed in
order to correct for this. The fit is poor, with strong under estimation of labour force
participation of females in couples. Qualitative results obtained for the reforms with the
two different baselines do not differ much.
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Fig. 4 Relative welfare gains from a switch to linear taxation for married men, collective model
Table 10 Winners and losers: collective versus unitary model, linear taxation
f f f f0 f0 f0 f+ f+ f+ Total
m m0 m+ m m0 m+ m m0 m+
hous 39.6 10.8 18.4 1.6 1.4 1.4 4.3 .7 1.4 79.6
hous0 2.3 3.2 2.8 .4 .6 .5 1.1 .8 .6 12.2
hous+ .8 1.4 1.3 .3 .8 .5 1.3 .8 1.1 8.2
Total 42.7 15.3 22.5 2.3 2.9 2.4 6.7 2.3 3.1 1,332
Total f (f ) 80.5 (f0) 7.5 (f+) 12.0 1,332
Total m (m ) 51.7 (m0) 20.4 (m+) 27.9 1,332
Note: move from the 1998 to the linear tax scheme. Rows correspond to winning (hous+), indifferent (hous0)
and losing (hous ) couples, on the basis of the estimated coefficients of the unitary model. Households are
considered indifferent if their post reform utility level is within –.1% of the pre reform level. Columns
correspond to the winning, indifferent or losing wives and husbands on the basis of the simulated ‘‘col
lective’’ data. Spouses are considered indifferent if their post reform utility level reform is within –.1% of
the pre reform level
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The Belgian reform improves the bargaining position of a majority of women. Col
lective labour supply reactions to the reform are moderate, and the same result emerges
when using the unitary model instead. But whereas the unitary model predicts that 97% of
the households benefit from the reform, for the collective model there is a Pareto
improvement for only 65.5%, and not all of these are winners according to the unitary
model. Gini coefficients on equivalent incomes and concentration ratios focusing on in
come tax, obtained with both types of models, are in agreement qualitatively, although they
differ in absolute values. The reform slightly reduces inequality, and increases the con
centration of tax payments.
The second reform considered is the introduction of a linear income tax, which replaces
both the current tax system and social security contributions. For each model, the flat tax
rate was first set at a level of 50%. In a second step, a basic income (applicable to both
singles and individuals in couples) was chosen to ensure revenue neutrality. Since labour
supply reactions may differ across models, this basic income may also differ (for the first
baseline situation, e.g., the basic income associated with the collective model is equal to
2,860 euro; whereas it is equal to 2,830 euro for the unitary model).
The linear taxation also leads to moderate labour supply reactions when predicted with
the collective model. For the unitary model, the predicted behavior for women is similar,
although more pronounced reactions are obtained, but for men the overall direction of the
change is reversed. According to the collective model, the reform is a Pareto improvement
for about 30% of the households, disadvantages both spouses for some 20%, and has
conflicting impacts for 46%. These ambiguous effects are only very partially captured by
the unitary model, for which 42% of the households win and 57% lose. According to both
models, the reform increases overall inequality, leaving the concentration ratio almost
unchanged.
6.2. France
The effects of the French tax credit reform on labour supplies, as predicted by the col
lective model, are rather small, with only 5% of wives and 1% of husbands altering their
labour supply. Some 10% of these are not recipients of the tax credit after the reform: this
type of reaction is purely ‘‘collective’’, and is ruled out by the unitary setting. The esti
mation of a unitary model without leisure interaction term (LES) on the collective baseline
leads to regular preferences for all households in the sample. Predictions are poor: only
41% of the women have correct labour supply predictions (75% for men). For the positive
analysis of the reform, the unitary model under predicts the changes found with the col
lective one, but both models agree in finding that the reform does not fulfil its objective, as
it does not succeed in increasing participation of low wage earners, at least if one restricts
attention to couples. For 19% of the couples, the reform appears indifferent from the
unitary point of view, whereas he wins and she loses for the collective model. For 32% the
reform is preferred (U), whereas she wins and he loses (C). For only 23% total agreement
is found, in that the reform is preferred for (U) and Pareto improving for (C).
Contradictions concern only 1% of households.
6.3. Germany
Beyond the linear tax reform, for which results were reported above, the German Tax
Reform 2000 and a revenue neutral move from joint to individual taxation were also
analyzed.
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Taking (C) as reference, (U) yields about 33% correct predictions for reactions to the
German tax reform and to individual taxation, and 40% for reactions to linear taxation.
Overall, (U) predicts more changes than (C).
The German tax reform 2000 has negative welfare effects for 23% of individuals in
couples, with equal shares of men and women in this percentage. Overall the reform is
more beneficial to women (71% win) than to men (53%). For the unitary model 81% of the
households benefit from the reform, but the collective model shows only 66% Pareto
winners (+ +), less than 1% of Pareto losers, and 22% of conflicting changes (+) and )+).
For this reform there are few (3.4%) outright contradictions between the two models ((U+,
C) )), (U+, C) =), (U+, C= )), (U+, C= =), etc.).
For individual taxation, revenue neutrality is obtained by multiplying the tax liability by
a factor of .942 for the collective model, and by a factor of .894 for the unitary model.
Thus, the tax burden is predicted to shift from singles to couples in a much more pro
nounced way when using the unitary model. The collective model shows that the only
decile of the distribution of pre reform equivalent incomes in which a majority of women
prefer the reform to the status quo is the highest decile. For men, there are some large gains
and losses (measured in relative terms) at all deciles. The unitary model finds the largest
percentage of winners in the highest two deciles, but also the largest losses. There are only
3.5% Pareto winners, but 56% Pareto losers, and conflicting effects arise for 32% of the
households. Some 8% contradictions arise between the two models.
6.4. Italy
The estimation of a unitary model leads to poor predictions on a sample of Italian
households. Working hours predictions are correct for only 34% of men and 57% of
women. The estimated unitary model tends to smooth the distribution of labour supply,
leading to over prediction for men and under prediction for women. In particular, 13% of
wives are predicted to be out of the labour market whereas they are working full time, and
more than 50% of men are predicted working 10 h more than actual.
Two tax reforms were evaluated, namely the 2002 tax system and a linear income tax.
The first one is not expected to be revenue neutral, due to both a reduction in tax rates and a
substantial increase in tax credit for children and for employment income. The hypothetical
linear tax system is defined to ensure revenue neutrality. In both reforms the largest
discrepancies between the collective and the unitary model are found in the male labour
supply, as only 35% (31%) of the cases are on the main diagonal when the 2002 reform
(the linear income tax) is introduced in the simulation exercise. Moreover, husbands are
expected to react much more to the first reform according to the unitary model than what is
predicted by the collective framework. The unitary model also predicts a higher drop in
women’s participation.
6.5. UK
The unitary model is estimated on the collective baseline as derived in Myck et al. (2006).
The household utility function includes a leisure interaction term and the estimated
coefficients give rise to regular preferences for the whole sample. The unitary specification
does remarkably well in predicting the underlying (collective) distribution of hours. In
deed, hours are predicted accurately for 58% of men and 64% of women, and with a 10 h
margin of error for 94.5% of men and 96% of women. Relative to the collective model,
however, the unitary specification over predicts nonparticipation. While 2.9% of men and
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10.2% of women are not employed in the collective baseline, the figures are 7.6% and
13.2%, respectively in the unitary model.
The unitary model does not allow us to model distribution of resources between partners
and therefore to distinguish between two variants of the Working Families Tax Credit
(WFTC) reform: one where the benefit is paid to the main carer and the other when it is
paid to the main earner. Simulation of the WFTC using the unitary model results in smaller
labour market response to the reform than either of the variants simulated in the collective
world. For 20.4% out of the 2,619 couples with children in our sample the reform leads to a
change in the number of working hours (relative to 35.0% for either of the variants of the
WFTC simulation using the collective model). As we would expect, all of those who
change their hours of work choose a combination of male and female hours at which they
can claim the new credit. Most couples who change their labour supply reduce their hours
of work and, as expected, there is a significant shift from two and no earner couples to
one earner families. The main difference between the unitary and the collective simula
tions is a much greater effect of the reform on employment of men. While the collective
model predicts an increase in male participation from 96.3% to 98.2% (when WFTC is
paid to main carer) and 97.7% (when it is paid to main earner) the unitary model predicts
an increase from 89.4% to 94.6%. The percentage point increase in female employment
rate is similar: while the collective model predicts a reduction from 85.6% to either 79.5%
or 80.4%, the simulation using the unitary model results in the reduction of the female
employment rate from 82.4% to 76.0%.
6.6. Summary
An important result is that all studies which estimate a unitary model (for Belgium, France,
Germany, Italy and the UK) find substantial distortions arising from its use in predicting
the positive and normative effects of reforms. The study for Spain (Raquel Carrasco and
Javier Ruiz Castillo, 2002) also produces evidence of such distortions, by separating
‘unitary effects’ of the collective model, that is, effects obtained considering only changes
in the budget restriction, and not the changes in the bargaining position of the spouses.
7. Conclusion
The aim of this study has been to illustrate the distortions in policy evaluation entailed by
the use of unitary model estimates when the underlying data obey collective rationality.
We have addressed this question by estimating a unitary model on realistically simulated
micro data for Germany within a collective setup.
A comparison of the collective data and the unitary predictions showed that in the
baseline situation, on average, labour supply is underpredicted by the unitary model. In
total, only a third of female labour supply decisions are correctly predicted (the corre
sponding figure for men is 40%). Much more interesting for policy evaluation are the
distortions in predicted labour supply adjustments in reaction to a tax reform. For the move
to linear taxation, and taking the collective predictions as the reference, the unitary pre
dictions for the labour supply variation are correct for only about half of the wives. In the
collective setting, the labour supply of married women is more responsive to this reform
than their husbands’ is, whereas the unitary model predicts more men to alter their hours of
work. Thus, by basing policy evaluation on unitary estimates when the data are generated
by the collective model, the changes in hours for wives and for husbands will be
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underestimated and overestimated, respectively. Our results also show that the design of
revenue neutral reforms itself may be heavily distorted by the use of a unitary model on
collective data.
Turning to the normative aspects of reform evaluation, we compare changes in
household utility predicted by the unitary model and changes in individual utility predicted
by the collective model. We find that these predictions are contradictory for more than 16%
of the households (e.g., decrease in household utility for the unitary model, while the
reform is seen as Pareto improving at the household level for the collective model). An
other distinguishing trait of the collective model is that it allows for diverging effects
on the welfare of both partners, whereas the unitary model is mute on 2006. It turns out that
the move to a linear tax system in Germany creates conflicting welfare effects for 29%
of the households.
While these results must still be considered as only illustrative, because there are several
shortcomings in our approach (in particular, we do not take into account household pro
duction; the calibration approach for the identification of the spouses’ weights and the
cross leisure term may capture part of the unobservable heterogeneity in the model; also
the specification of the income sharing rule may be problematic), they amply document the
rewards to be expected from further work on the estimation of multi person household
models in realistic settings.
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Appendix A: Detailed description of the German tax-benefit system
Germany has a personal income tax system administered at the federal level and regulated
by the Personal Income Law (Einkommensteuergesetz). The German tax system is char
acterized by a comprehensive tax that covers labour earnings as well as income from other
sources, such as capital investment or housing rents, and by joint taxation for married
couples. For our exercise we use a simplified form of the 1998 German tax benefit system.9
Gross income is the sum of income from different sources: income from employment,
capital investment, rental and leasing and maintenance payments received from an ex
partner. Gross taxable income is equal to gross income minus income related expenses.
The standard deductions are listed in Table A.1.
The function applied to the tax base is smoothly progressive. In 1998 the top rate
applied was 53% for yearly earnings in excess of DM 120,041.10 Earnings below the basic
personal allowance of DM 12,365 are tax free. The tax schedule used is the same for
singles and for couples. However for couples, the ‘Ehegattensplitting’ method (marital
splitting) is used: the tax rate is applied to half of the joint taxable income, and the outcome
9 This simplification is an adaptation, to our particular sample and emphasis, of the microsimulation
program developed at ZEW (for a description see the documentation by Peter and Steiner 2003).
10 For convenience, the tax rules and our tax program are written in DM rather than in euro, as the nonlinear
1998 German tax scheme is only available in DM (1 euro 1.95583 DM). All other nominal magnitudes in
the paper are given in euro.
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is doubled in order to obtain the total income tax liability of the spouses. Tax rate pro
gressivity and marital splitting lead to a relative advantage for married couples if spouses
have unequal incomes.
Parents can opt for either a child benefit (DM 220 for the first and the second child, DM
300 for the third and DM 350 from the fourth child on) or a child allowance, that is a lump
sum deduction of DM 6,912 for each child up to age 27, if still in education or doing
military or civil service. Due to the progressive tax scheme the child benefit is less, and the
tax deduction is more, favorable for high income households.
Social benefits are means tested and depend on the number of people in the house
hold.11 As a simplification, we assume that the maximum social benefit (including housing
benefit and special payments) a person can receive is DM 1,000 a month and DM 700 for
Table A.1 Simplified tax benefit system for household taxation, Germany 1998 singles (married couples)
Taxable income
earnings
capital income
income from rental and leasing
maintenance payments from ex partner
Tax reliefs
DM 2,000 (4,000) standard deduction for earnings(a)
DM 6,000 (12,000) standard deduction for capital income
DM 108 (216) standard special expense deduction
child allowance (or child benefit alternatively)
exemption for social security contribution (‘Vorsorge’)
maintenance payments to ex partner
Tax base: taxable income minus tax reliefs
Tax schedule: tax rate applied to (half) the tax base:
Income (X) bracket Income tax liability
0 12,365 0
12,366 58,643 (91.19ÆY+2,590)ÆY
58,644 120,041 (151.96Æ Z+3,343)Æ Z+13,938
>120,041 .53ÆX 22,843
X rounded taxable income, Y (X 12,312)/10,000, Z (X 58,590/10,000)
solidarity supplement: tax scaled up by a factor of 1.055 (b)
Net Income: gross income minus (twice) the tax liability
Benefits
child benefit: DM 220 for 1st and 2nd child, DM 300 for 3rd, DM 350 from 4th child on (or child allowance
alternatively)
means tested social benefits (incl. housing benefit and special payments):(c) DM 1,000 in the West, DM 900
in the East(d)
means tested social benefits for partner and children, depending on age
Maintenance
maintenance payments to children, ex partners or parents outside the household
Disposable income: net income plus benefits minus maintenance
Notes: (a)The tax scheme is given in DM because of the nonlinearity of the tax function. Since 2000, the tax
scheme is given in DM and euro by the Federal Government. 1 euro 1.95583 DM. Time unit is the year.
(b)The solidarity supplement for the reconstruction of East Germany (‘Solidaritatszuschlag’) is based on a
measure of taxable income that includes the child allowance whether or not parents opt for it. (c)For lack of
information on the stock of savings etc., we assume that couples reporting more than DM 600 capital income
or more than DM 4,800 rental income per year are not eligible for social benefit payments. (d)These numbers
are based on the average effective maximum social benefit paid in 1998 Statistisches Bundesamt (2001)
11 In this static setting we ignore unemployment insurance and unemployment benefits, which are both
related to former earnings. Both transfers actually require the search of, and the willingness to take up, a job.
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the partner.12 In addition there are age dependent supplementary payments for children.
The amount of the transfer is decreasing in the level of earned income (‘anrechnungsfreies
Erwerbseinkommen’). In addition, social benefits are related to the geographical location,
since they are paid by the local governments and housing benefits depend on the average
rent of the locality. We distinguish only between East and West Germany, and approxi
mate that social benefits are 10% lower in the East. The difference between East and West
Germany stems from the lower costs of living in the East as a substantial fraction of the
social benefit is the housing benefit. Finally, social benefit payments depend on the wealth
situation of the household, and child benefits are deducted from social benefit payments.
As a graphical illustration of the tax benefit system described above, Fig. 5 depicts a
typical situation for a couple with two children. The husband has an hourly wage rate of
25 euro, the wife earns 18 euro per hour. The household does not have any capital inflows
or income from rental or leasing. It is therefore eligible for means tested social benefits at
low labour income. The parents receive child benefit for both children. From a yearly gross
income of just above 80,000 euro they will opt for child allowance instead, as the tax relief
exceeds the lump sum benefit payment. Figure 5 also reveals the nonconvexity of the
resulting budget constraint when labour earnings are high enough for social benefit
payments to cease.
Appendix B: Sample description
Table B.1 shows descriptive statistics for singles and for couples with various sociode
mographic characteristics. On average, women have a lower schooling and vocational
yearly gross income
 disposable income  child benefit / allowance
 social benefit  income tax
0 20000 40000 60000 80000 100000 120000
0
20000
40000
60000
80000
100000
Fig. 5 The 1998 German tax benefit system. Situation of a couple with two children. The wife and the
husband earn respectively 18 and 25 euro per hour. They potentially receive means tested social benefit
12 The maximum social allowances we apply for both parts of Germany are based on the average effective
maximum social benefits paid in 1998 (see Statistisches, 2001).
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education level than men. For example 15% of the husbands in the sample have a poly
technic or university degree, but only 8% of the wives. More than half of the couples live
with 1 child at most. Only few households receive housing or social benefits. Most couples
have capital income.
Appendix C: Concavity condition of the unitary utility function
The utility function is
U c; lf ; lm
 
bc lnðc cÞ þ bf lnðlf lf Þ þ bm lnðlm lmÞ
þ d lnðlf lf Þ lnðlm lmÞ
We assume that all the differences c c; lf lf ; lm lm are strictly positive, as well as
the coefficients bc,bf and bm. Since the gradient of U is
Table B.1 Descriptive statistics on the selected samples
Single women Single men Mar. women Mar. men
Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d. Mean s.d.
Participation .94 (e) .96 .71 .97
Age 37.2 9.44 36.7 7.98 39.5 7.04 41.9 7.34
Schooling(a)
No degree .03 .04 .02 .01
Short secondary .34 .35 .41 .31
Long secondary .23 .21 .12 .19
Other .03 .02 .06 .06
Voc. training(b)
No training .13 .06 .10 .05
Technical training .21 .18 .24 .25
Univ. or polytech. .14 .18 .08 .15
East Germany .14 .20 .28 .28
Separ. or divorced .27 .32
Never married .66 .68
Widowed .07 .00
# Children 0 0 1.40 1.06 1.40 1.06
No children 1 1 .22 .22
1 Child 0 0 .31 .31
2 Children 0 0 .36 .36
‡3 Children (#)(c) 3.39 .28 3.39 .28
Hours work (week) 36.8 5.65 38.9 6.40 30.1 10.4 39.6 5.53
Gross wage (hour)(d) 13.1 4.75 14.6 5.75 11.6 5.17 15.6 6.56
Capital income 40.1 72.1 42.4 74.9 52.1 143.5 52.1 143.5
Child benefit 131.2 45.9 147.6 64.2 206.0 124.8 206.0 124.8
Total unearned
inc. (month)(f)
49.5 195.5 30.4 234.2 321.9 459.1 321.9 459.1
Observations 208 280 1,332 1,332
Notes: (a)reference category: primary school; short and long secondary school correspond to ‘Reals
chulabschlus’ and ‘Abitur’; (b)reference category: apprenticeship; technical training and polytechnic cor
respond to ‘Fachschule’ and ‘Fachhochschule’; (c)for this and the four subsequent variables, statistics
concern only positive values; (d)nominal variables in euro; (e)variables for which only the mean is shown are
indicator variables; (f)total unearned income also includes rental and leasing, social benefit, housing benefit,
incomes of children and net maintenance payments; highly negative net maintenance may lead to negative
total unearned income
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a sufficient condition for U to be increasing in its arguments is
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We assume that this condition is satisfied. The hessian of U is
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Calling A the second diagonal block, concavity of U is then equivalent with A negative,
thus, given condition 5, with A>0. Thus the concavity condition is
bf þ d ln lm lm
  
bm þ d ln lf lf
  
[d2: ðC:3Þ
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